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Military-political Trends within the CIS during the Chechen Campaign
Part II: Bilateral Approaches
Zusammenfassung
Apart from multilateral agreements Russia develops special links to some strategic important 
CIS members. A development toward the resurrection of Soviet-styled armed forces is not likely 
within the CIS. More so, however, are the efforts to bring about Russian-led military forces on a 
regional level. Three main directions can be discerned: the Eastern Axis (Russia-Kazakhstan), 
the Western Axis (Belarus-Moldova-Kaliningrad), and Transcaucasus. In all these areas, treaties 
on military cooperation have been signed during the first half of 1995. The article shows that the 
trend towards increased military cooperation on a regional level within the CIS seems largely 
unaffected by Russia's military campaign in Chechnya.
Implementation of the Collective Security Treaty
A serious attempt  to  put  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  into  practice  was made  at  the  10  February 
Summit.1 Thirteen documents were discussed, however only three were finally adopted.
• Concept on Collective Security (guidelines for the deepening of military cooperation under the same 
treaty).
1 This was followed up in September by President Yeltsin's endorsement of the country's strategic policy towards the CIS. The 
policy is based on the collective security treaty and bilateral treaties between CIS states. See Interfax 16 September 1995. In 
FBIS-SOV-95-180 p. 1.
• Declaration of the Participating States of the Collective Security Treaty
• Memorandum on Peace and Stability in the CIS states. 
The memorandum was initially drafted  as a pact  by Kazakhstan, but because of disagreements it  was 
watered down to a memorandum.
In the declaration1, principles for the security system are spelled out. It is to be implemented in stages. 
First  the creation of the armed forces in the participating states are to be "basically completed," and 
military-technical  cooperation  is  to  have  started.  In the  second  stage  coalition  (joint)  troop  (force) 
groupings are to be created to repel possible aggression and a joint air defence system will be created. In 
the final stage the creation of the collective security system will be completed.
These guidelines were further discussed in May, when a plan for implementing the concept of collective 
security, and the basic guidelines for deepening military cooperation between CIS states was approved. 
The plan spans the period through the year 2 000. It envisages the creation of regional coalition forces, 
the elaboration of operations plans for their use in the event of aggression and the holding of command-
staff games. Measures have been planned to coordinate  efforts in the sphere of the development and 
production of arms and combat equipment,  material  supplies for the troops. The army paper Krasnaya 
Zvezda labelled it as a "highly serious document."
These are, however, guidelines and principles. The concrete ways of actually creating military integration 
have not been realised. The plans about what the future should hold are not lacking. The integration will 
start  with  the  formation  of  a  chiefs  of  staff  committee  and  four  regional  collective  security  zones, 
according to Leonid Ivashov, secretary of the CIS Defence Ministers' Council. Four military regions are 
planned to be set up on CIS territory. Western, Eastern, Central Asian, and Caucasus zones will unite 
nine  CIS  member  states,  to  be  cooperated  with  on  an  irregular  basis  by  Ukraine  ,  Moldova  and 
Turkmenistan.2
The Western Zone would have Belarus "as the key element" and include the Kaliningrad and Smolensk 
regions of  Russia.  The  Caucasus Zone  would  include  Azerbaijan,  Armenia,  Georgia,  and  the  North 
Caucasus republics of Russia.  Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,  and part of Kyrgyzstan would form the Central 
Asian Zone,  with Turkmenistan cooperating "on some elements." Finally,  the Eastern Zone would be 
made  up of Kazakhstan  and  those parts  of  Russia  and  Kyrgyzstan  not  in  other  zones.  Furthermore, 
Ivashov envisions "Coalition Defence Forces" which would train jointly and have common standards. The 
proposals are to be submitted to the CIS heads of states at the end of 1995.
These plans were taken one step further at a meeting of the CIS Defence Ministers in April. A decision 
was made to set up a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of the CIS Armed Forces as part of the Staff for the 
Coordination of Military Cooperation. According Ivashov, the committee will conduct "profound analysis 
of program, theoretical, and practical matters and the coordination of the operations of CIS armies' staff".3
A development with regional collective forces is perhaps a likely development as a base for CIS military 
cooperation.  As we  have  seen,  efforts  from Moscow point  in  this  direction.  Furthermore,  there  are 
indications that such forces are being set up in Transcaucasus.4
Bilateral military agreements
There are several kinds of treaties within the framework of the CIS. Multilateral treaties are made more 
concrete through bilateral treaties. In case the multilateral treaties fail or cannot be agreed, the bilateral 
1 Diplomatichekiy Vestnik, No. 3, 1995, pp. 33-37.
2 Interfax, 14 February 1995. In SWB SU/2229 A/2 (16 February). In April 1995 a preliminary agreement was reached that at 
least one Russian Air defence aviation squadron will be based in Turkmenistan.
3 OMRI Daily Digest, 26 April 1995, Vol. 1., No. 82
4 Itar-TASS, 13 April 1995. In SWB SU/2280 S1/5 (18 April 1995).
treaties can be seen as an alternative. The bilateral agreements can be divided  into the following four 
categories. 1
• Friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance
• Friendship, cooperation and mutual security
• Friendship and cooperation
• Military agreements
The Eastern Axis - Russia and Kazakhstan
The first agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance within the CIS was reached between 
Russia and Kazakhstan 25  May 1992.  It has since been followed up by several  bilateral  treaties,  for 
instance on military issues 28 March 1994. The documents signed by the presidents on 20 January 1995 
took issues a bit further.2 All  in all  they signed 17 agreements, including two agreements on issues of 
citizenship, an agreement on military-technical cooperation and the creation of a customs union. 
In the  declaration  on expanding and  deepening Russian-Kazakh  cooperation the  presidents vow that 
"from 1995 the parties will begin forming unified armed forces based on the principles of joint planning, 
training and use of troops (forces) and provision of weapons and military equipment for them, and under 
conditions where they will be stationed without hindrance, operate,  enjoy most-favoured status...".(No. 
10) In addition, they declared that "in conditions where the borders between the two states are open, the 
protection of their external border is their common task, and will be carried out jointly in accordance 
with the interests of their own security and the collective security of the CIS. To this end a treaty on joint 
protection of external borders, envisaging the creation of a joint command for the border troops will be 
signed by 10th February 1995 by the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation." (No. 12). The 
two countries are also to cooperate closely on foreign policy (No. 13) and to coordinate their foreign 
economic policies (No. 3). 
The creation of unified armed forces may sound clear enough, but there is considerable confusion about 
what this actually means. The chief of the Kazakh General Staff, Alibek Kasymov, declared that "these 
joint  armed  forces will  not  be a  single  armed  force  along the  lines of the  Soviet  Army.  That  could 
frighten some people/.../ Our approach is that these will be national armed forces joined on the basis of 
certain principles."3 He also stated that he found the "NATO option most attractive," and dismissed the 
CIS Joint Armed Forces as unsuitable.
The Western Axis - Belarus, Moldova and Kaliningrad
Belarus and Russia were never far apart, and have been trying to cooperate in most spheres, not the least 
economically. On 21 February Russia and Belarus signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, where 
the two countries pledge to have open borders between themselves (Article 4) and to consult each other 
on foreign policy (Article  3).4 Among the  agreements reached,  a  treaty concerning the  borders were 
signed. The treaty contains a definition of what constitutes security on the borders with Lithuania, Latvia 
and  Poland.  In practice,  this means that  Russia is shifting its border  interests far to the  west of the 
administrative  borders.  The  Belarusian  border  troops will  be  coordinated  from Moscow even  if  the 
1 Boris Meissner, Das politische Paktsystem innerhalb der GUS, Osteuropa-Recht, September 1994, 3/94, pp. 226-254.
2 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 1995, No. 2, p. 40-48.
3 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda 7 February 1995. In JPRS-UMA-95-007 pp. 70-71.
4 Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, 1995, No. 3, pp. 38-42.
commander will still be Belarusian. His deputy will be Russian. Practical details on joint border troops 
were not finalised. In addition, it was decided that Russia will lease the two early-warning system sites in 
Vileyka and Baranavichy for 25 years.
The recent developments in Moldova, the youngest member of the CIS, have implications for a future 
security  system.  The  withdrawal  of  the  14th  army was agreed  in  October  1994.1 It  provided  for  a 
withdrawal in three stages. The first two stages involves the pull-out of weapons and military hardware, 
with troops to be withdrawn in the final stage.
The accord has still to be ratified by the Russian parliament, and even if it does become ratified it is not 
likely to mean that Russian troops will leave Moldova entirely. Despite the fact of Moldova's declared 
neutrality policy, Moscow does not rule out the possibility of having troops in Moldova. As late as July,  
Moscow began,  for the first time since 1992,  to send Russian conscripts to reinforce its units in the 
Transdniester region. Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, has made it clear that Russia would like to have 
a military base with some 3,500 servicemen in that region. 2The military's view is that the Russian troops 
stabilise  the  situation  in  the  republic,  and  President  Yeltsin  has  stated  that  Russian  troops'  stay  in 
Moldova "can be reviewed at any time."3
Even if the current Russian military doctrine does not regard any state an enemy to Russia, Moldova is of 
strategic importance, and would form an important place for the mobile forces that are currently being 
planned for.4
This is no less true, of course, for Kaliningrad oblast. Apart from an agreement with Lithuania in January 
1995 to extend military transit regulations until the end of 1995,  the future plans for the oblast are not 
publicly discussed. However, last year Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on the Defence Ministry's plans 
for creating a "special defence region" in Kaliningrad. It would contain large groupings of ground forces, 
military aviation, air defence forces, and naval units. These forces would cooperate with Border Troops 
and,  possibly,  with Internal  Ministry Forces. The special  force would be subordinated  directly  to the 
Defence Ministry and General Staff.5
Transcaucasus
Transcaucasus has for obvious reasons been an area of high tensions and sensitivity during the Chechen 
campaign. In March, Russian army bases were secured in both Armenia and Georgia. According to the 
treaty  with Armenia  the  127th  Motorised  Rifle  Division will  be  stationed  in  Gyumri  in  north west 
Armenia.6 A Russian command group will be stationed in Yerevan and a motorised rifle regiment. The 
25-year treaty will be automatically extended for five years, unless one of the sides objects. The Russian 
Defence  Minister,  Pavel  Grachev  noted  that  "close  and  constructive  military  and  military-technical 
cooperation between Russia and Armenia could serve as an example for other Commonwealth countries."7
1 Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 1994, No. 21-22, pp. 46-51.
2 OMRI Daily Digest, 28 June 1995, Vol. 1, No. 125.
3 Itar-TASS, 28 June 1995. In FBIS-SOV-95-124 pp. 12-13.
4 See for instance Sean Kay, "The Political Victory of the Russian Military: Assessing the Impact on the New Military Doctrine," 
December 1993, June 1994, University of Massachusetts Ð Amherst. C. J. Dick: "Initial Thoughts on Russia«s Draft Military 
Doctrine And Russia«s Draft Military Doctrine, 10 Months On", July 1992, April 1993, Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA 
Sandhurst. Rossiyskaya Gazeta 29 June 1995. In FBIS-SOV-95-125. The current Russian Military Doctrine was adopted on 2 
November 1993, but  President Yeltsin has  hinted that a new one is being developed. See Yeltsin's message to the Federal 
Assembly, note 1. 
5 RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 March 1994.
6 Segondya,  17 March 1995 "Presidenty Eltsin i Ter-Petrosyan podpisali dogovor o voennoi base." Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, 
1995, No. 4, p. 36.
7 Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 March 1995, "Vazhnyi faktor bezopasnosti."
The joint exercise held later in March had according to the Russian Defence Minister Pavel  Grachev 
been  prepared  in  the  light  of  the  shortcomings in  troop command  and  combat  use  revealed  by the 
Chechen conflict.  The Georgian Defence Minister,  Vardiko Nadibaidze,  who was present at  the final 
stage of the Armenian-Russian joint military exercises voiced a hope that in the near future not only bi-
lateral, but also trilateral military exercises with participation of Georgian units would be held. 
According to the agreement between Russia and Georgia, there will be four Russian military bases in 
Gudauta, Batumi, Akhalkalaki and Vaziani.1 It is a 25 year agreement. 
In the light of these developments in Transcaucasus, it is interesting to take a brief look at the Russian 
military's  view on the  treaty on Conventional  Forces in Europe (CFE treaty).  It is not  new that  the 
Russian military has been critical of the treaty ever since it came into force on 17 July 1992. By this time 
the circumstances had changed dramatically since the treaty was signed in November 1990 and both the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist.2 At one point the Russian even sought the support 
of Ukraine,  since the treaty would also affect  the Odessa military district.  When Ukraine maintained 
their compliance with the treaty, the Russians were alone in their efforts to renegotiate the flank limits. 3 
The view of the military was made explicit when Vladimir Semyonov, commander of the Russian ground 
forces acknowledged that the creation of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District would 
violate the terms of the CFE treaty but that "the interests of Russian security integrity must prevail over 
the  terms of this document."  General  Anatolii  Kvashnin,  commander  of the  North Caucasus military 
district was even more blunt: "Only a complete idiot would comply with the flank limits of the CFE."4
Even  if  the  opinions of  the  foreign  ministry are  not  always  expressed  in  the  same  frank  way,  they 
nevertheless correspond with the military's view. President  Yeltsin set the tone in his annual  address 
when he pointed out that "it is important that we find ways to resolve the well-known problem of the 
flank restrictions" under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - a problem that has arisen 
visibly in the North Caucasus."5
Conclusions
As we have seen, Russia has signed a number of military-political treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, 
within the CIS, during the first half of 1995. In addition, ideas and proposal about a future CIS military 
system  have  been  publicly  discussed.  But  will  all  these  treaties  be  implemented,  and  if  so  what 
conclusions can be drawn? The question about the implementation is highly appropriate since literally 
hundreds  of  documents have  been  signed  between the  CIS member  states  without  ever  coming into 
practice.  However, the signing of the treaties - at  least the military related which are being examined 
here - points in a certain direction, and forms a base for future actions. The issue of military integration 
is,  obviously,  largely  dependent  on  economic  and  political  integration.  When  the  Russian  Defence 
Minister, Pavel Grachev, talked about military reform in the Russian army he shortly remarked that "if 
there will be money there will be reform." The same is true for CIS military integration.
Furthermore, there are still unsolved problems, the most striking perhaps both politically and militarily, 
Russia's relations with Ukraine.  In spite of continuous efforts, the two countries have not yet  signed a 
Treaty of Friendship, largely because of the dispute about the Black Sea Fleet.
However, the trend of a Russian-led military domination, based on a regional level,  within the CIS is 
1 Ibid.
2 Douglas L. Clarke. "The Russian Military and the CFE Treaty", RFE/RL Research Report, 22 October 1993, Vol. 2, No. 42, pp.  
38-43.
3 Segondya, 27 April 1995, "Novaya armiya na Kavkaze "ne vpisyvaetsya" v dogovor ob OVSE".
4 Ibid.
5 Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 17 February 1995. In SWB SU/2233/S1 (21 February 1995).
clear.  The  Chechen  campaign  has not  changed  this,  especially  not  with  the  agreements  on Russian 
military bases in Armenia and Georgia. It could also be argued that the Chechen campaign could serve as 
a deterrent for the countries in Russia's "near abroad" to resist the integration process. This is true es-
pecially for the weaker states in Transcaucasus and Central Asia.1It is doubtful, whether one could claim 
that the latest military developments are a result of a "new" Russian strategy. The Russian military view 
on the CIS cooperation has not changed substantially since the creation of the CIS. The "new" feature is 
the recent concrete results.
1 Yerevan Yerkir. 22 December 1994. In  FBIS-SOV-95-023-S. Pages 71-72. See also Rossiyskiye  Vesti 26 January 1995. In 
FBIS-SOV-95-018, pp. 23-24.
Even if it seems unlikely today to view the CIS military cooperation as an alliance that will become a 
counterweight to an expanded NATO, as Komsomolskaya Pravda reported to be the opinion of the staff 
working on military reform1,  it  is no less indicative  of the thinking in some Russian military circles. 
During the first half of 1995,  the events point toward a stronger regional military cooperation between 
the members of the CIS Collective Security System.
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